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A strong case can be made that the essence of all foreign policy matters involves the most basic of 
psychological boundaries: between the "me" and "not me." Research in developmental psychology 
suggests that ontogenetic development of these boundaries is first characterized by primary narcissism--
everything is me--then a secondary narcissism--everything good is me, everything bad is not me--after 
this some asymptotic approach towards realism--similar and/or dissimilar aspects of good and bad 
characterizing the me and not me. Some theorists even posit a fourth process: some asymptotic 
approach towards idealism wherein the me and not me are recognized to share the essentials of 
humanity amidst the hosannas of We Are the World. (Later in development, generalization occurs to the 
we and not we--dyads, groups, organizations, and even more macromolecular entities like nation-states 
and the supranational.) 
 
Foreign policy begins with the development, implementation, and evaluation of coping strategies to 
manage interactions across the boundaries between me and not me as these interactions impact on 
survival, the satisfaction of needs, and, in general, adaptation. This psychological foundation of foreign 
policy can often help explicate dilemmas such as those involving the potential for proliferation of 
nuclear material from the Caucasus nation-state of Georgia. 
 
As reported in The New York Times, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) have initiated 
removing nuclear material--highly enriched uranium and spent nuclear fuel--from Georgia to the UK. 
(This occurred after the Russian government first seemed to engage and then disengage from 
cooperating on the Issue, while the French seem to have never seriously engaged.) As long as the 
material remained in Georgia, the proliferation concerns largely included (1) authorized or unauthorized 
sale by elements of the Georgian government on the black market or directly to nation-states or other 
political entities seeking to develop, maintain, or increase a nuclear weapons capability; (2) theft by 
criminal entities or even Georgian insurgent paramilitary forces for sale to the same sources as in (1) 
above; (3) theft by political entities, criminal or otherwise--e.g., representatives of nation-states, 
terrorist groups--for their own nuclear weapons needs or for sale to the same sources as in (1) above. 
 
The psychological boundary Issues have been many. (1) The US Government (USG)--with the very broad 
conception of "me" characteristic of a superpower--viewed the nuclear material as "me" because of the 
potential security consequences that could be "bad." Thus, it made sense for USG policy to embrace 
engagement with other political entities possessing nuclear material. To a lesser degree the UK 
Government did this as well in identification with the interests of the more powerful USG. (2) The USG 
apparently rejected the option of moving the nuclear material within its territory because of potential 
legal challenges from US environmentalist individuals and groups. The latter apparently viewed the 
material as "bad" and "not me"--not perceiving that poorly regulated nuclear material anywhere in the 
world can become "me" with unfortunate consequences while well-regulated nuclear material can 
become "good" through minimization of its weaponization potential. (The environmentalist challenge--
as well as that of nationalists from Scotland where the material is to be stored and reprocessed and of 
political opposition members--appears to be less of a serious Issue to the UK government as of this 
writing.) (3) The Georgian government viewed the nuclear material as "me" and "bad" and desired the 
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"bad" to become "good" through transfer to a safe repository. Or, perhaps, it viewed the material as 
"not me" even if residing within its territory--an ego dystonic status inducing a form of psychological 
splitting--and desired to remove the foreign body from its own. These and similar boundary 
interpretations facilitated engagement with the USG on nuclear nonproliferation. (4) The Russian 
government originally viewed the material as "me" and "good" during the era of the Soviet Union (SU) 
and for some interval after the SU's disestablishment, then "not me" and "bad" reflecting a host of 
complex political and economic calculations. Negotiations among the USG, the Georgian government, 
and Russia were eventually at an impasse. To the French, the whole matter appeared to be "not me" 
and "bad." 
 
As with a government's hostile propaganda operations that attack domestic ethnic groups as a foreign 
body--"not me" and "bad"--nuclear proliferation policy seems based largely on unconscious dynamics of 
"me," "not me," "good," and "bad" as much if not more than rational and logical calculations of political, 
military, social, cultural, and economic consequence. Unfortunately, from the depths of the unconscious 
can rise conscious imperviousness to disconfirming information and the conscious propensity for 
conflict. (See Benassy, M. (1963). Les theories du "moi" en psychanalyse. Bulletin de Psychologie, 16, 
568-573; Elkin, H. (1961). The emergence of human being in infancy. Review of Existential Psychology 
and Psychiatry, 1, 17-26; Gordon, M.R. (April 21, 1998). U.S., Britain relocate nuclear material from 
volatile Georgia. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Hoge, W. (April 23, 1998). Blair defends 
his decision to accept atom material. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Leeds, U. (1961). 
The schizoid problem, regression, and the struggle to preserve an ego. British Journal of Medical 
Psychology, 34, 223-244; Mackay, N. (1981). Melanie Klein's metapsychology: Phenomenological and 
mechanistic perspective. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 62, 187-198.) (Keywords: Georgia, 
Nonproliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Political Psychology, Russia, Security.) 
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